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Enforcement Discretion Under Attack:
Implications for FDA
By Lewis A. Grossman*
Author’s note: On June 23, as this article was going to press, the Supreme Court deadlocked 4-4 in U.S. v. Texas, thus
affirming a preliminary injunction against implementation of the Obama Administration’s deferred-action program for
millions of undocumented immigrants. Because the Court’s terse per curiam decision established no precedent, the questions that the case raised regarding the permissible scope of administrative enforcement discretion remain unresolved on the
national level. The Supreme Court will likely consider them again—after a decision on a permanent injunction in the same
case, in a similar immigration dispute, or perhaps in another field of administrative law. The issues explored by this article
thus remain very much alive.
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eckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821
(1985), is the leading precedent
for the principle that an agency’s
decision not to bring an enforcement
action is a presumptively unreviewable
exercise of administrative discretion.
In Heckler, the Supreme Court held
that the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) refusal to impose the
requirements of the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) on drugs
used for lethal injection of convicted
inmates was nonjusticiable under
§ 701(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
Some in the administrative law
community were thus startled several
years ago when, in a strikingly similar
case, the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia held that another
failure by FDA to enforce the FDCA
against a death penalty drug was not
immune from judicial review. Beaty
v. FDA, 853 F. Supp. 2d 30 (2012). A
close reading of Judge Leon’s opinion
and the D.C. Circuit’s decision
affirming it, Cook v. FDA, 733 F.3d 1
(D.C. Cir. 2013), explains the apparent
incongruity. The death row prisoners
in Cook challenged FDA’s failure to
prevent the importation of misbranded
and unapproved drugs manufactured
overseas. This situation is governed by
FDCA § 801(a), a provision phrased
in unambiguously mandatory terms
that was not relevant to the wholly
domestic circumstances addressed by
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Heckler. Cook thus does not represent a
comprehensive threat to the presumptive unreviewability of agencies’ use of
enforcement discretion.
United States v. Texas, a case that
the Supreme Court deadlocked in
June, potentially has more sweeping
implications. In this matter, argued on
April 18, twenty-six states are challenging an Obama Administration
program called Deferred Action for
Parents of American Citizens and
Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA).
The Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) instituted
this program in a November 2014
memorandum to the Director
of Citizenship and Immigration
Services. This “DAPA Memo,”
framed as an exercise of prosecutorial
discretion, would defer the deportation of undocumented parents of
citizens and permanent residents for
three years, if the parents have lived in
the country for at least five years and
satisfy several other conditions. DAPA
grants such parents the revocable
status of “lawful presence”—a status
that makes them eligible to apply for
work authorization and to participate
in certain federal earned-benefit
programs, including Social Security.
The states sued to enjoin the
implementation of DAPA in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Texas. They contended
that such an action requires APA
notice-and-comment rulemaking
and represents an unreasonable
interpretation of the Immigration
and Naturalization Act (INA). The
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District Court issued a preliminary
injunction, rejecting the United
States’ contention that DAPA is an
unreviewable exercise of enforcement discretion, and the Fifth
Circuit affirmed. The Supreme
Court is considering the applicability
of Heckler non-justiciability, along
with other issues.
Regardless of how the case is
decided, Texas is an occasion to
consider how deeply engrained
enforcement discretion is in the
administrative state, not only as a
method for allocating scarce government resources, but also (as with
DAPA) for advancing particular
policies. FDA’s administration of the
FDCA provides manifold examples
of this phenomenon. Throughout its
broad portfolio of responsibilities,
the agency has established numerous programs organized explicitly
around the systematic exercise of
enforcement discretion.
Take, for example, the issue of
filth in food. Section 402(a)(3) of the
FDCA declares a food to be adulterated if it contains “any filthy, putrid,
or decomposed substance” (emphasis
added). As a formal matter, therefore,
the presence of just one rodent hair or
one insect renders a product illegal.
Although few if any foods satisfy this
standard, FDA has not emptied supermarket shelves. Instead, it has adopted
“defect action levels.” See 21 C.F.R.
§ 110.110. The Defect Action Levels
Handbook, available on the agency’s
website, lists nonhazardous levels
of natural or unavoidable defects in
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particular foods below which each
product is effectively immune from
enforcement action.
Or consider the procedure the
agency has established permitting
food manufacturers to make disease
prevention claims (“health claims”)
that do not meet the “significant
scientific agreement” standard
imposed by § 403(r)(3) of the FDCA.
Under its “qualified health claims”
framework, the agency sends
petitioners “letters of enforcement
discretion” declaring its intention
not to object to claims with lesser
scientific substantiation. Because FDA
created this approach in response
to court decisions imposing First
Amendment limitations on the
agency’s authority, there technically
is nothing “discretionary” about it.
Nevertheless, the qualified health
claims regime provides another
prominent illustration of how FDA
sometimes elaborates its enforcement
discretion into a systematic program
comparable to DAPA.
FDA has taken similar approaches
on the medical products side of its
domain. For example, although
importation of unapproved drugs and
devices is illegal under the FDCA,
the agency has long permitted
individuals to import “personal use”
amounts of such products, and it
has set forth this policy in writing
since at least 1977. The current FDA
Regulatory Procedures Manual
contains a “Personal Importation”
section that provides “general
guidance” setting forth factors FDA
personnel should use in allowing
entry to personal shipments of unapproved drugs and devices. Although
the Manual frames the personal
importation policy as a reasonable allocation of limited agency
resources, the Commissioner’s
public defense of the approach in
the late 1980’s, in the midst of the
AIDS crisis, left no doubt that it is
motivated by compassion as well as
economy. Because it involves importation, this policy is threatened by
the Cook decision, regardless of how
Texas is decided.
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FDA’s programmatic use of administrative discretion is not limited
to imported drugs and devices.
One of the most sweeping recent
exercises of enforcement discretion
by FDA in this field concerns the
regulation of laboratory developed
tests (LDTs)—a category comprising
in vitro diagnostic devices (IVDs)
designed, manufactured, and used
within a single laboratory. Since the
agency gained its modern authority
over medical devices in 1976, it has
deemed LDTs to be devices subject
to the FDCA, but has nonetheless
declined to apply the Act to them as a
matter of general practice. Recently,
however, the agency decided that
it will begin subjecting most LDTs
to the Act’s device requirements. In
2014 draft guidance, FDA set forth a
detailed, risk-based plan for phasing
in regulatory oversight of LDTs
during a nine-year period following
finalization of the guidance.
In some important respects, the
LDT draft guidance resembles the
DAPA Memo. Both documents
purport to establish enforcement
“priorities” that, as a practical matter,
temporarily exempt certain defined
categories of people/products from
otherwise applicable statutory provisions. As an exercise of enforcement
discretion, however, the LDT guidance actually goes further than the
DAPA Memo, by identifying several
categories of LDTs (for example,
IVDs for rare diseases) that FDA plans
to permanently exempt from some or
all of the FDCA’s requirements. The
DAPA Memo at least clings to the
illusion that it is a “deferred” enforcement program.
Last year, FDA established a similar
approach to the regulation of mobile
medical software applications. A
February 2015 final guidance,
through descriptions and examples,
divides mobile apps into three categories. One includes apps that, though
related to health, do not satisfy the
statutory definition of “device” and
are thus not covered by the FDCA.
A second group consists of apps that
are medical devices that pose a risk to

patient safety if they malfunction; the
agency subjects these products to the
full panoply of regulatory requirements for devices. The third category
of products limned by the guidance is
probably the biggest and most diverse.
It comprises “mobile apps that may
meet the definition of medical device
but because they pose a lower risk to
the public, FDA intends to exercise
enforcement discretion over these
devices (meaning it will not enforce
requirements under the FDCA).” In
other words, the guidance carves out
a large and growing body of products
subject to the Act and declares that
the agency simply will not apply the
law to them.
Could the Supreme Court’s
decision in Texas threaten some
or all of FDA’s broad applications
of enforcement discretion? If the
Court addresses justiciability under
Heckler—rather than deadlocking
4-4 or deciding the case on standing
grounds—the implications for the
FDA policies discussed above will
depend on the opinion’s particular
reasoning. Although unlikely, the
Court could embrace the bold argument advanced in an amicus brief filed
by three former Attorneys General,
Edwin Meese, Richard Thornburgh,
and John Ashcroft. They contended
that agency decisions to refuse
enforcement are immune from
judicial review only when limited
to “particular individuals and cases.”
According to this view, any “generally applicable” or “class-wide” policy
of nonenforcement, such as DAPA, is
justiciable. Were the Court to adopt
this approach, most or all of the FDA
policies discussed above could be
vulnerable, as could similar programs
throughout the administrative state.
The states in Texas advanced a
more modest position. They did not
challenge DHS’s blanket exercise of
enforcement discretion in and of itself.
Indeed, at oral argument, Texas’s
Solicitor General explicitly conceded,
“I do believe [DHS] could do it class
based if [it] were simply forbearing
from removal.” The problem, according to the states, is that DAPA would
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confer various affirmative benefits
on four million unlawfully present
aliens, including the status of “lawful
presence,” eligibility for work authorization, and the right to apply for
participation in Social Security and
other federal programs. Consequently,
the states asserted, DAPA is not
merely a discretionary nonenforcement decision of the sort that Heckler
declared to be nonjusticiable, but
instead an “affirmative governmental
action” subject to judicial review.
The United States responded to this
line of argument by emphasizing that
“lawful presence” is an immigration
law term of art that signifies nothing
but government forbearance from
removal and that “lawfully present”
aliens’ eligibility for federal benefits
f lows not from the DAPA Memo
itself, but from preexisting statutes,
regulations, and policies.
At first glance, these questions
may seem too closely tied to the
immigration context to be relevant
to FDA exercises of enforcement
discretion. But there is arguably
a parallel between DHS allowing
unlawfully present immigrants
to participate in the labor market
and FDA allowing illegal food,
drugs, and devices to be sold in the
market for goods. Furthermore,
nonenforcement of the FDCA may
make the manufacturers of such
products eligible for various federal
financial benefits. For example, the
U.S. military buys massive quantities
of food that technically violates the
Act because it contains low levels of
filth, and the National School Lunch
Program reimburses schools for the
purchase of such food. Similarly,
it seems almost certain that the
Veterans Health Administration
directly purchases some drugs and
devices that are available only because
of FDA enforcement discretion,
and that Medicare and Medicaid
reimburse for the cost of such
products. Consequently, a Supreme
Court decision embracing the states’
argument for the justiciability of the
suit challenging DAPA may open the
door to judicial review of comparable

implementations of enforcement
discretion by FDA.
If the Supreme Court deems the
states’ cause of action to be justiciable,
it might then reach another question
with broad (though unclear) implications for FDA—namely, whether
DHS was required to follow the APA’s
§ 553 notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements when issuing the
DAPA Memo. The United States
argued that the memorandum is a
“general policy statement” exempt
from notice-and-comment under
§ 553(b)(3)(A). The government
pointed to the nonbinding character
of the DAPA Memo, as ref lected in
language in the document stating
that it is a “policy” that “confers
no substantive right” and “may be
terminated at any time.” In upholding
the preliminary injunction against
DHS, the Fifth Circuit rejected this
argument and concluded instead that
the states were substantially likely to
succeed on their claim that the DAPA
Memo is a legislative rule subject to
notice-and-comment procedures
because it confers certain affirmative
benefits and does not “genuinely”
leave DHS and its employees free to
exercise discretion.
As we have seen, FDA routinely
announces broad applications of
enforcement discretion in guidance
documents. The agency deems
these guidances to be general policy
statements exempt from APA
notice-and-comment procedures.
In at least one prominent instance,
however, the D.C. Circuit invalidated
an FDA guideline declaring an
exercise of enforcement discretion.
The court held that the guideline
in question was effectively binding
on the agency and thus subject to
notice-and-comment requirements.
Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818
F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1987). FDA’s
current “good guidance practice”
regulations try to ensure the exempt
status of all guidance documents by
requiring that they avoid the use of
mandatory language and prominently
display a declaration of the document’s nonbinding effect. 21 C.F.R.
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§ 10.115(i). If, however, the Supreme
Court in Texas looks past the DAPA
Memo’s nonbinding language and
holds that it is binding in practice and
thus required to undergo notice-andcomment procedures, that decision
may encourage similar attacks against
FDA guidances that declare the exercise of enforcement discretion.
Because the question of whether a
particular guidance leaves an agency
with genuine discretion is a casespecific inquiry, any such decision by
the Supreme Court in Texas concerning DAPA would have uncertain
implications for FDA. In any event,
the imposition of APA noticeand-comment procedures, though
burdensome, would not preclude FDA
from continuing to issue categorical
enforcement exemptions. Therefore,
a state victory in Texas on the § 553
issue would not necessarily represent a
profound challenge to FDA’s approach
to exercising enforcement discretion.
The same cannot be said with
respect to states’ constitutional argument in Texas. More specifically, the
states contend that DAPA violates
Art. II, § 3 of the U.S. Constitution,
requiring the President to “take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed.”
If the Court declares DAPA invalid
under the Take Care Clause, it could,
depending on its reasoning, call into
question the constitutionality of all
class-based exercises of enforcement
discretion by any agency. Although
the Court specifically requested
briefing on this issue, it was not
even mentioned at oral argument
and seems unlikely to determine the
outcome of Texas. If the Court is even
tempted to strike down DAPA on
this basis, however, it should be aware
that such a decision would potentially
deprive FDA (and other agencies) of a
vital regulatory tool and transform the
way they do business.
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